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CALCULATING ROYALTY:
“COSTS” SUBSEQUENT TO
"COSTS"
PRODUCTION

Professor Owen L. Anderson

Royalty Valuation:
Should Royalty Obligations Be Determined
Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically?
Part 1
Why All the Fuss? What Does History Reveal?
Owen L. Anderson

THE ISSUES:
(1) WHY SO MUCH RECENT ROYALTY
LITIGATION?
(2) WHAT DOES "ROY
AL TY" MEAN?
"ROYALTY"
(3) MUST LESSEE PAY ROYALTY ON VALUE
ADDED BY "POST-PRODUCTION"
“POST-PRODUCTION” ACTIVITIES
UNDER COMMON GAS ROYALTY CLAUSES?
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My Conclusion
Absent an express royalty provision to the contrary,
lessees should not have to pay royalty on value
added by "post-production"
“post-production” activities.

Three general principles:
(1) royalty should be payable on "production;"
“production;”
(2) production is not complete until a "first“firstmarketable product"
product” has been obtained;
(3) express royalty clause provisions govern over
these first two principles, but because royalty
clauses are both executory and anticipatory in
nature, they should be construed as a whole, in
light of current market realities (not narrowly
construed by isolating certain words or phrases
that ignore general intent).
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So why all the fuss?
First, there is great disagreement over what constitutes
"production."
“production.”
Compare: Texas, Oklahoma & Louisiana

Texas Courts
"Production,"
“Production,” under the habendum clause.
requires actual extraction and use or marketing.
Likewise, under "market
“market value"/"market
value”/“market price"
price”
clauses, royalty is payable on current
gas royalty clauses,
market value when gas is actually extracted from the
ground and used or marketed, even though lessee
may have received a different contract price and "take
“take
or pay"
pay” payments.
Nevertheless, under NationsBank, royalty gas is
apparently valued immediately upon extraction at the
wellhead (not after its actual use or marketing). [In
other words, royalty is payable on the "intrinsic
value"
“intrinsic value”
of gas at the wellhead and commonly calculated by
deducting post-wellhead costs.]
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Oklahoma Courts
Unlike Texas, "production,"
“production,” under the habendum
clause, occurs when a completed well is capable of
producing oil or gas.
But, like Texas, "production,"
“production,” under the royalty
clause, requires actual production. Thus, like Texas,
royalty is not payable on "take
“take or pay"
pay” payments.
Nevertheless, unlike Texas, "market
“market price"
price” or
"market
value" royalties are generally payable on
“market value”
contract prices, not on current values when the gas is
actually extracted.
Unlike Texas, royalty is valued upon marketing.
not immediately upon extraction. [In other words,
certain post-wellhead costs are not deductible.]

Louisiana
Like Texas and unlike Oklahoma, "production"
“production”
under the habendum clause requires actual extraction
and use or marketing of gas, but is valued immediately
upon extraction.
However, like Oklahoma and unlike
Texas,"market price"
Texas,“market
price” and "market
“market value"
value” royalties are
generally paid on contract prices, not on current values
when the gas is actually extracted.
But unlike both Texas and Oklahoma, royalty is
generally owed on "take
“take or pay"
pay” payments and
settlements.

4

So why all the fuss now?
Because***
Because * * *
[N}obody
[N obody wants to take a lot of profit at their
subsidiary[anymore].
producing subsidiary
[anymore].
Jim Shaw, Associate Director
Royalty Management Program
Minerals Management Service
"U.S.
“U.S. Industry Under Attack for Alleged Royalty
Underpayments,"
1996@
Underpayments,” O&GJ, Oct. 28,
28,1996
@ 19-20.
19—20.

Why is that so?

1.

The deregulation of natural gas marketing?
Yes, partly.

2.

The "reform"
“reform” of the % oil & gas depletion
allowance.
Yes, the principal reason.
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Example 1. using a 27.5% depletion allowance:
allowance:
By pushing profits upstream or income downstream or
both, a lessee (not making an arm’s
arm's length wellhead sale)
claims $2.00/Mcf. gross income from the property.
Assuming a 15% royalty/overriding royalty burden,
lessee's
lessee’s royalty obligation is 30¢.
300. Assuming a 5%
production tax, lessee's
lessee’s proportionate share of production
taxes is 10¢. Thus, lessee's
lessee’s net royalty/tax burden is 38.5c.
38.5¢.

Lessee's
Lessee’s depletion allowance is 46.75c
46.75¢ [production@
[production @
$2.00/Mcf less 15% royalty burden times 27.5% depletion
allowance].
Lessee gains 8.25
8.25¢c [the difference between 46.75¢
depletion and 38.5¢ royalty/ production-tax burden].

Example 2. using a 27.5% depletion allowance.
allowance.
Lessee claims gross income of only $1.00/Mcf.
Lessee's
Lessee’s total royalty burden is 15¢, and lessee's
lessee’s
proportionate share of production tax is 4.25¢. Thus,
lessee's
lessee’s total royalty/tax burden in 19.25c.
19.25¢.
Lessee's
Lessee’s share of the 27.5% percentage depletion
23.375¢.
allowance is 23.375c.
Lessee gains 4.125c
4.125¢ [half of the 8.25¢ net benefit
realized if the gas is valued at $2.00/Mcf.].

6

Compare @
@ 15% Depletion
Example 1.
At $2.00/Mcf, lessee's
lessee’s share of percentage depletion is 25.5¢.
Lessee's
Lessee’s royalty/tax burden would still be 38.5¢.
Lessee loses 13¢.
Example 2
At $1.00/Mcf, lessee's
lessee’s share is 12.75¢. Lessee's
Lessee’s royalty
burden would still be 19.25¢.
Lessee loses only 6.5¢.
6.50.
Compare Cost Depletion
No incentive to re-direct profits or costs. All costs, whether
upstream or down, are deductible or depreciable.

Royalty History
"[T]here
“[T]here is something in the nature of the property right
itself-something
itself—something in the nature of the "bundle
“bundle of
sticks"
sticks” that is a royalty that answers the question: The
lessor’s percentage is a percentage of what?
lessor's
Consistent with the sharing arrangement with the
Crown that gave the "royalty"
“royalty” interest its name, the
most obvious answer is that the lessor's
lessor’s royalty
entitles the lessor to a share of the produced mineral in
its natural state, after the mineral has been brought to
the surface by the lessee."
lessee.”
Wllllams
et al., "Determining
•..
Williams at
“Determining the Royally
Royalty Owner's
Owner’s Shar•
Share of Post-Production Costs ...
;· 41 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 12-1,
12-5 (1995). See
Sea also, Anderson,"Davld
12-1,12-5
Anderson,“David v. Goliath .•.
...
,"
1114-16 (1982).
,” 278
27B Rocky Ml.
Mt. Min. L. lnst.1029,
Inst. 1029,1114-16
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My Findings
There is no evidence of a "property
“property law"
law” definition of
royalty or that the established point of royalty
valuation was at the mouth of the mine or well (the
point where raw ore or oil or gas was converted from
real to personal property).
Rather the royalty entitlement depended entirely upon
the language of the governing ordinance, decree, or
contract.
Contractual terms varied, but payment of royalty upon
the value of a merchantable product was common.

Sources other than the U.S.
Ancient Greece, the silver mines of Laurium, circa 480 b.c.
Roman Empire, marble quarries.
Cornwall & Devon, England, tin, 1263 - 1830s.
Derbyshire, England, lead, 1288.
Spain, precious metals, circa 1387 a.d. and circa 1559.
New Spain, precious metals, 1700s.
England, metals, 1850s.
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Early U.
S.Law
Law
U.S.
1. The royalty obligation is a sharing arrangement.
2. Payment obligations are determined by reasonably
construing the royalty clause in light of the parties'
parties’
reasonable expectations and the clause's
clause’s anticipatory nature.
3. Royalty valuation depends upon the language of the
royalty clause, not upon a property law definition of royalty.
4. Royalty valuation is commonly tied to the marketability.

5. Royalty valuation excludes value added by transportation.
transportation.
6. If production is first sold beyond the first market, early
cases are both divided and counter-intuitive on whether
downstream profits must be shared with the royalty owner.

Early U.S. Law

Wright v. Warrior Run Coal Co.
Audenreid v. Woodward
Wolfing v. Ralston
Maloney v. Love
Wemple v. Producer's
Producer’s Oil Co.
Clark v. Slick Oil Co.
Busbey v. Russell
Scott v. Steinberger
Martin v. Amos
Barton v. Laclede Oil & Mining Co.
Armstrong v. Skelly Oil Co.
Rains v. Kentucky Oil Co.
Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmiaer
Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen
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Scholarly Commentary
Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases § 85 (2d ed. 1940).

"If
“If it is the lessee's obligation to market the
product, it seems necessarily to follow that his is
the task also to prepare it for market, if it is
unmerchantable in its natural form. It is erroneous
to read into the royalty clause stipulations
concerning the cost of marketing and preparation
which are not specifically expressed."
expressed.”

Fundamental Contract Law.
If a party to a contract owes a particular duty of
performance [such as the duty to market
production] that party has an obligation to absorb
the costs of performance in absence of an express
agreement to the contrary.
This principle is so fundamental that contracts scholars only
discuss it in the context of whether unforeseen costs may
excuse performance under the doctrines of impossibility and
impracticability. There is never a suggestion that the other
party to the contract is charged with such costs. Farnsworth,
Contracts§
Contracts § 9.6 (2d ed. 1990); Jaeger, Williston on Contracts§
Contracts §
1963 (3d ed. 1978); Corbin, Corbin on Contracts§
Contracts § 1333 (1962).
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Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas,§
Gas, § 40.5(b) (1989).
"[T]here
“[T]here is a distinction between acts which
constitute production and acts which constitute
processing or refining .... Unquestionably, under
most leases.
leases, the lessee must bear all costs of
production. There is, however, no reason to impose
on the lessee the costs of refining or processing the
product, unless an intention to do so is revealed by
the lease. It is submitted that the acts which
constitute production have not ceased until a
marketable product has been obtained. After a
marketable product has been obtained, then further
costs ... should be shared by the lessor and the
lessee....”
lessee
.... "

OTHER SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY
FAVORABLE TO A FIRST MARKETABLE PRODUCT RULE
Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas§
Gas § 7.4 (3d. Ed. 1991).
Walker, "The
“The Nature of Property Interests Created by an
Oil and Gas Lease in Texas,"
Texas,” 10 Tex. L. Rev. 291,313
291, 313 (1932).
Thuss, Texas Oil and Gas Law § 126 (2d ed. 1935).
Compare:
Williams, Oil and Gas Law § 645.2 (1995);
Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas § 589 (1958);
Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law §§ 92 and70 (1955).
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Conclusions Respecting Part I

1. The primary cause of current royalty litigation is
depletion reform. Natural gas deregulation is
secondary.
2. Throughout early history(both
history(both U.S. and foreign),
royalty provisions have been construed in light of:
their express language;
the parties’
parties' reasonable expectations;
their anticipatory nature;
and their purpose.
3. Early U. S. case law supports a marketability
approach.

Part 2
Should Courts Contemplate the Forest or Dissect Each Tree?
(a look a modern royalty case law)
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My basic conclusion:*
Many modern gas royalty clauses* should be viewed
as a forest of clauses expressing similar anticipatory
obligations to share with the lessor.
Royalty clauses are intentionally general in language
so that they will function fairly and efficiently for
what may be decades of production, regardless of
the specific circumstances.
Unfortunately, many modern royalty cases ignore the
fundamental principle that royalty means a "share."
“share.”
* Not included are clauses drafted by lessors, state, federal or
Indian leases, and clauses custom drafted for a specific use.

Construction of Royalty Clauses
"Too
“Too much dependence is placed upon the language of
a printed form, in the preparation of which at least one
party has had no part and to the selection of which the
other frequently has given no consideration, if upon a
variance of that language a difference is established in
to.” Maurice Merrill, Covenants
a duty not specifically referred to."
Implied in Oil and Gas Leases§
Leases § 85 (2d ed. 1940).

"[Royalty
“[Royalty rights] must be determined, not by isolating
certain words from the connection in which they occur,
and putting an interpretation upon them without regard
to their relative situation, but by considering all the
language of which the words form a part."
part.” Maloney v. Love,
52 P. 1029 (Colo. Ct. App. 1898).
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"Resort
“Resort to grammatical parsing is less instructive ...
...
than is a consideration of the purpose of the gas
royalty clause, taken as a whole."
whole.” Piney Woods Country Life
School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 1984).

Regrettably, however, the Piney Woods court failed to
heed its own advice.

Often, modern royalty cases distinguish
distinquish words that
are really synonyms.

Examples:
Vela (distinguishing "market
“market price"
price” and "proceeds")
“proceeds”)
and Piney Woods (distinguishing "market
“market value"
value” and
"proceeds").
“proceeds”).
But see, Tara Petroleum Corp., Hilliard, and Henry (making no
such distinction).

Roye Realty (in dicta, suggesting a distinction
between "proceeds"
“proceeds” and "amount
“amount realized").
realized”).
But see, Upham ("Webster
(“Webster defines ... 'proceeds'
‘proceeds’ as the
'amount
‘amount realized from the sale of property'
property’....”)
.... ") and Skaggs
(the court held that "amount
“amount received"
received” means "proceeds").
“proceeds”).
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Where did this "parsing"
“parsing” get started?

Perhaps inadvertently: Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Coffee.
The court makes an evidentiary distinction between
"market
“market price"
price” (established by looking at actual arm's
arm’s
length contracts and sales) and "market
“market value"
value”
(established by expert testimony concerning market
prices).
The court made no substantive distinction between
these terms, but merely preferred the former as
evidence where a single price was known.

Vela
Veld See also, Foster (an earlier federal case reaching a similar
result).
Gas contract was made in 1934 for the life of the lease
at 2.3¢
2.30 per Mcf. (Initially, there was no market because
purchaser was unwilling to pay 3¢
30 for compression.)
At time of litigation, new gas was being sold for 16
16¢¢
per Mcf., less 3¢
3¢ for compression. Lessors essentially
sued for the difference pursuant to a "market
“market price"
price”
royalty clause.

Held: 5 to 4 for the lessors.
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Royalty clauses contemplate market realities.
They refer to "market
“market price,"
price,” "market
“market value,"
value,”
"proceeds," or "amount
“proceeds,”
“amount realized"--terms
realized” --terms well
known to the marketplace.
These terms require:
a willing buyer,
a willing seller,
a marketable product,
a market, and
a sale.

Ve/a-type cases, the same gas from
And contrary to Vela-type
the same field can have different market values.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum illustrates this.
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The most unfortunate Vela-type
Ve/a-type case: Piney Woods.
The key words of the bifurcated royalty clauses:
well"
If sold/used off the premises: "market
“market value at the well”
If sold at the well: "amount
“amount realized"
realized”

Judge Wisdom held that the gas was not sold at the
well.
To hold otherwise "would
“would place the lessors at the
mercy of the lessee"
lessee” and allow lessee to "avoid
“avoid the
payment of market value royalty."
royalty.”
“[S]trange results ... may occur if the determination of
"[S]trange
whether gas is 'sold
well' turns solely on the
‘sold at the well’
place where title passes."
passes.”
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Gamblers' Bargain
The Piney Woods Gamblers’
“A landowner is offered leases by two producers.
"A
The first offers a 1/8 market value royalty; the
second offers a 1/6 proceeds royalty. The
landowner decides to lease to the first operator,
because he thinks the market value of gas will rise
enough to compensate for the lower fractional
share. This is ·a business risk: if the price does not
rise enough, the lessor loses money. If, however,
the price rises as the lessor thought, the lessor has
won his bet, just as the lessee has lost his gamble
.... "
that the price would not rise
rise....”

“At some point, the lessee may find the continued
"At
operation so unprofitable that it is more economical to
cease production. At this point the lessor has a strong
lease.”
incentive to renegotiate the lease."

'
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Where are we? The gas was not sold at the well; thus,
royalty is owed on current "market
well."
“market value at the well.”
Problem:
Problem: the gas at the well is "extremely
“extremely sour"
sour” and and
must be converted into "marketable
“marketable sweet gas."
gas.”
At the Well "describes
“describes not only the location of the gas
for royalty purposes, but its quality
.... "
quality....”

Judge Wisdom’s
Wisdom's Solution:
Solution:
although "least
“least desirable,"
desirable,”
"market
“market value"
value” royalty can
be calculated by taking the
"actual
“actual sales price of gas
less costs"
costs” after all.

The End Result: A Real Gamblers'
Gamblers’ Bargain
(1) If gas is truly sold "at
“at the well,"
well,” royalty is owed on the
sale proceeds (perhaps set by a long-term, fixed-price
contract).
(2) If gas is not sold at the well, royalty is due on current
market value at the well when extracted.
(3) The lessee controls where the gas is sold (limited by
market realities and good faith), provided that a sale
ostensibly made at the well must really be at the well, not
"off
“off the premises."
premises.”
(4) Provided however, that "market
well" for
“market value at the well”
“off the premises"
premises” may be determined by
gas sold "off
subtracting post-wellhead costs (including a rate of
return after taxes) from the contract price (not current
market value), if the trial judge concludes that this "least
“least
desirable” valuation method is nevertheless appropriate
desirable"
under the circumstances.

n
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"Wild
“Wild Cards"
Cards” for future Piney Woods:
Woods:
The trial court's
court’s discretion concerning:
(1) Whether lessee's
well" sale violates the implied
lessee’s "at
“at the well”
duty to market at the best available price and terms?
(2) Whether an "at-the-well"
“at-the-well” sale is really at the well?
“market value at
(3) What constitutes the best evidence of "market
well” for gas sold "off
“off the premises"?
premises”? ((comparable
the well"
comparable
sales, expert testimony of value, or the actual
downstream contract price less post-wellhead costs)
(4) Whether the the lessee's
lessee’s actual calculation of postpost
“costs” is appropriate?
wellhead "costs"

The Bottom Line
Neither a lessor nor a lessee would knowingly make this
gamblers’ bargain.
gamblers'

If lessors were really concerned about being locked into
the pricing terms of a long-term contract that was not of
their making, they would insist on a pure "market
“market value"
value”
royalty clause like the one in Vela.
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But a lessee would not knowingly accept such a
bargain, let alone draft a lease royalty clause with this
intent.
In a rising market, lessee would have to pay more and
more royalty even though the lessee may have made
a prudent decision to sell gas for a set term at a fixed
price.

Lessees’
Lessees' Intent

Regarding post-wellhead costs, lessees knew how to
address them directly:
“Lessor’s
"Lessor's interest shall bear its proportion of any
compression, treating, and other expenses
marketable.”
necessary to render the gas marketable."
29, 1945.
Maddox v. Texas Co., construing a lease dated October 29,1945.

But, as George Siefken teaches in his 1954 article.
An alert lessor could too easily amend this clause:
NOT
.... "
“Lessor’s interest shall /\ bear
b e a r....”
"Lessor's
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Three Fundamental Principles
1. A royalty clause should be construed in its
entirety against the party who offered it, in light of
the fact that it is the means by which the lessor
receives the primary consideration for a productive
lease.
2. In light of legal history and absent an express
lease provision, a lessee who discovers oil or gas
in paying quantities is obliged to "produce"
“produce” a
“marketable product."
product.”
"marketable
.
3. When a marketable product is first obtained: is a
question of fact; is the logical point where the
exploration and production segment of the oil &
gas industry ends; is when the primary objective of
the lease is achieved; and is thus the logical point
for the calculation of royalty.

The Troublesome California "at
well" Cases:
“at the well”
Cases:
Alamitos Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co.
Vedder Petroleum Corp. v. Lambert Lands Co.
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State.

well" cases from other states:
Troublesome "at
“at the well”
states:

Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank., TX
Schroeder v. Terra Energy Ltd., Ml

22

Heritage Resources. Inc. v. NationsBank
"market
“market value of gas at the well"
well”
The court concludes:
that "market
“market value at the well"
well” has a commonly
accepted meaning in the oil and gas industry and

value" means "the
that "market
“market value”
“the price a willing seller
obtains from a willing buyer."
buyer.”
But, then concludes
that "market
“market value at the well"
well” can be calculated by
“subtracting reasonable post-production marketing
"subtracting
costs
.... "
costs....”

The lease in NationsBank also provided:
provided:
"there
“there shall be no deductions from the value of Lessor's
Lessor’s
royalty by reason of any required processing, cost of
dehydration, compression, transportation, or other matter
to market such gas."
gas.”
The court concludes that this language was "surplusage
“surplusage as
a matter of law."
law.”
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What did the lessors intend?
Their intent was to share in all proceeds received by
the lessee for the sale of oil and gas without
deductions
--even
-even beyond the point of first-marketability,
--but
-b u t never less than market value at the well as a
hedge against "sweetheart"
“sweetheart” sales.

Query whether a court should honor this intent, given
well"?
the lessors'
lessors’ retention of the phrase "at
“at the well”?

Th~
cases:
The Troublesome "marketable
“marketable product"
product” cases:

Wood v. TXO, OK
TXO v. CLO, OK
Sternberger, KN ((not
not so troublesome)
Garman, CO
various compression cases
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The Troublesome "proceeds"
“proceeds” cases.

Miller v. Buck Creek Oil Co., "net
“net returns,"
returns,” WY
Upham v. Ladd, "proceeds,"
“proceeds,” TX
West v. Alpar,
A/par, "proceeds,"
“proceeds,” ND
Schroeder v. Terra Energy Ltd., "gross
“gross proceeds,"
proceeds,” Ml
“net proceeds,"
proceeds,” TX
Martin v. Glass, "net

Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., "net
“net proceeds,"
proceeds,” KS

The Economist Ponders the Forest
Ex Post: Royalty is inefficient, like an excise tax.
Ex Ante: Royalty is rational and reasonably efficient.
“cost free,"
free,” but it is not "risk
“risk free."
free.”
Royalty may be "cost

Problems with royalty clauses result from bad
drafting or unfortunate court decisions or both.
Basic marketplace realties (such as "marketability")
“marketability”)
should be considered in properly interpreting royalty
clauses.
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Conclusions
Construe lease royalty clauses as a whole in light of the
following factors:
>royalty clauses are anticipatory in nature;
>they call for a sharing;
>they govern royalty for the duration of production;
>because leases are freely assignable and often
assigned, lessees have a variety of lease forms in their
portfolios, the terms of which cannot be efficiently nor
easily honored if every variation among the royalty
clauses is subjected to grammatical parsing .

Unfortunately, many courts tend to over-interpret
royalty clauses, often emphasizing a single word or
phrase, e.g.:
"produced
“produced and sold or used,"
used,”
“off the premises,"
premises,”
"off
"at
“at the well,"
well,”
“amount realized,"
realized,”
"amount
“proceeds,” or
"proceeds,"
"market
value."
“market value.”
"free
“free of cost in the pipeline"
pipeline”
This approach is illustrated by cases such as
Vela,
Vela,
Middleton,
Middleton,
Piney Woods,
Woods,
NationsBank.
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The Typical Royalty Clause Contemplates:
Contemplates:
-real and willing buyers
-real and willing sellers
-dealing with a real product in the real marketplace
-actual commercial sales of a "product"
“product”
(requiring both "production"
“production” & "marketing")
“marketing”)
The Typical Royalty Clause Does Not Contemplate:
Contemplate:
-that royalty be paid on value added by post"production"
production”
(that is after a first-marketable product is in fact
obtained)

The Effect of A Marketable-Product Approach
-simplifies royalty accounting by using known values
-separates the e & p segment of the industry at the
logical place
-treats lessees the same regardless of size or situation
[lessees do not share downstream profits or losses with
lessors]
-through royalty accounting, lessors share
transportation costs whether incurred before or after
marketability is obtained [including compression not
directly related to extraction]
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Litigation

-overall, less likely (as valuation is simplified)
-class actions on a field-wide basis may be more likely
-class actions on a region- or state-wide basis less likely.

My Views Are Adopted In

Rogers et al. v. Westerman Farm Company et al.,
97CA0293,
1998).
97CA0293,1998 WL 89587 (Col. Ct. App. Dec. 24,
24,1998).
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